Ramsey County Law Library Blog

There was no ignoring last weekend’s news of the sudden death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Best known as the premier originalist on the nation’s highest bench, Scalia represented the position that the Constitution and each of its amendments mean exactly the same now as was intended on the day of their adoption. This is in contrast to the school of thought that views the Constitution as a living document, and that the task of interpreting it must adapt with the times.  (For a more in-depth look at Scalia’s interpretive style, consider his book Reading Law, wherein he and Bryan A. Garner spell out the principles of originalist interpretation.)  Typically employing his unique flair with words, Scalia was commonly regarded as both a champion and powerful voice for conservative causes before the Court.  Check out some of Scalia’s wittiest word-bites.

Scalia’s quieter legacy is the one he leaves behind to his surviving bench mates. By all recent news accounts, he was an engaging man who delighted in analyzing and debating the Constitution with his eight colleagues. The counter-position to his constitutional originalism was often represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who usually analyzed fr0m the Constitution-as-living-document position. She remembered her friend and colleague this week, recounting their pointed opinion-and-dissent duets, which she says reached a higher quality as a result of their joint counter-efforts. Their professional camaraderie actually became an opera in 2013 (an art form that they were both big fans of). Indeed, all of his colleagues treasured their warm close relationships with him, and had the highest respect for the jurisprudence he brought to their team.  This is a special legacy in our era of hyper-partisan politics, which has destroyed any such camaraderie within our Congress.

One can honor Scalia’s legacy in this quiet fashion, by simply actively appreciating those people in our lives who force us to be a little sharper, a little more thorough, and a little more prepared. Even when (especially when) their positions might be diametrically opposed to ours, these are the people who can ultimately bring out the best in us and spur us to our greatest accomplishments.

When it comes to the real-world application of a domestic abuse order for protection (OFP), the need for speed cannot be overlooked. This is why it was special news last week when the Minnesota Judicial Branch integrated OFP data into the Court Information System. It assists law enforcement by making OFP data immediately available to the BCA and FBI as soon as it goes into the Court Information System. Before this update,  courts transmitted these orders to law enforcement twice a day, so it was typically hours between a judge’s signing an OFP to cops on the beat having access to its existence. Likewise, the new system allows law enforcement to instantly report when an OFP has been served.  This new integration project began in the Ramsey District Court early last year, but now covers all Minnesota jurisdictions.

While this may not sound like a big development in itself, it is considering where domestic abuse law was in Minnesota not so long ago. Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act (MN Stat. §518B.01), which introduced the Order For Protection, was only adopted in 1979.  This article from the University of Minnesota Law School tells how a victim might not have any recourse prior to the OFP without filing for divorce (thus assuming she was married.)  The Act itself was groundbreaking in that it required police to make an arrest in cases where there was probable cause to believe an assault had occurred, but it was still far from perfect.  This 1989 Report of the Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts (chaired by the late Honorable Rosalie Wahl) reveals that even ten years after their introduction, OFP’s were seldom enforced due to judges’ attitudes (and probably also the limits of information technology) of the time. It also reveals that one seeking a protective order then might actually have to pay a filing fee or get an in forma pauperis (which they don’t now).

This news aside, domestic abuse remains a troubling problem in our community.  If you need immediate help, contact Ramsey County Domestic Abuse/Harassment Office or Bridges to Safety.

The U.S. Supreme Court is currently shining its legal beam on the practice of peremptorily striking potential jurors from panels due to race.  This practice doesn’t openly happen in our modern courts, of course, due to the Court’s race-neutral mandate per its 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 79).  In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential solely on race, and that prosecutors could be required to provide a race-neutral explanation when using a peremptory challenge to strike potential black jurors.  It is because of Batson that Minnesota has a three-step process to analyze whether a peremptory challenge was racially motivated. (See Minn.Rules.Crim.Pro 26.02 for jury selection requirements in criminal cases, and the allotment of preremptory strikes and challenges to peremptory strikes related to race or gender.)

Despite Batson, peremptorily striking black jurors is still shockingly common.  The current case of Foster v. Chatman features a death-row plaintiff who could win a new trial nearly twenty eight years after his original sentence. Timothy Tyrone Foster was sentenced to death by an all-white Georgia jury in 1987 for the murder of an elderly white woman, after all the potential black jurors had been stricken from the panel. The prosecution’s original jury selection notes from Foster’s sentencing have become the attention-grabbing exhibit in this case, featuring color-coded highlights with blatantly race-specific distinctions.  None of the Supreme Court justices has seemed pleased by this evidence, nor with explanations offered by the defense.  But prosecutors aren’t the only attorneys guilty of this practice, and they are likely not the only players behind a similar jury for a very different case currently being tried in Oklahoma.  Former police officer Daniel Holtzclaw is on trial for the sexual assault of thirteen black women while he was on duty.  For his alleged crime, Holtzclaw is being tried by an all-white jury of mostly men. (Similar to the race issue, it wasn’t so long ago that some courts needed a Supreme Court mandate to get women on their juries.)

Obviously, race is factor which inevitably bears on personal experiences, and can thus shape the way a potential juror might view the criminal justice system.  It’s no surprise that attorneys might try to racially-customize a jury, which is why Batson was necessary.  It has been asserted that the only solution to this race-bias danger is to eliminate the peremptory challenge practice in jury selection.  Yet peremptory challenges and its role in jury selection are a time-honored legal strategy of our justice system dating back to the common law. (Indeed, we offer resources in our library specifically on jury selection.)  Given this tradition and the demonstrated inadequacy of Batson, what is the real-world solution needed to ensure fair trials?  How likely is it to come from the Supreme Court as it considers the Foster case?

Much media commotion ensued last week when a local driver was pulled over by a state trooper for drinking coffee behind the wheel, according to the driver.  (The facts are in conflict, for the trooper stated that the driver was actually pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt.)  When you think about it, drinking coffee on the road certainly can be dangerous. We’re talking about piping-hot fluid, into which people will try to deposit packets of flavors, with flimsy lids that frequently malfunction. Probably a good number of drivers on a given weekday morning are “driving under the influence” so to speak, but many of those drivers will attest that their safe driving depends on that early morning caffeine boost.

Back to the driver at issue, is it illegal to drink coffee while driving in Minnesota? What activities are allowed while operating a motor vehicle?  Texting is out, but using your voice-activated phone is generally permitted. (For teens, no using cell phones behind the wheel under any circumstance except 911 calls.) Drivers cannot wear headphones, or be watching a mobile television, but consuming food or beverages seems to be acceptable.  But obviously one cannot properly control the vehicle when fumbling with a phone, a cheeseburger, or tending to  infant passengers.  And whether prohibited by statute or not, there is no end to the list of activities that can potentially make your drive dangerous.  So what are the legal ramifications of these various driving distractions, including coffee cups, phones, babies, etc.?

Basically, MN Stat 169.13 prohibits operating a vehicle “carelessly or heedlessly in disregard of the rights of others, or in a manner that endangers or is likely to endanger any property or any person, including the driver or passengers.” It might seem rather vague, but according to the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, distracted drivers can be ticketed under this statute.  Essentially, it is the state of being distracted that creates the driving risk, rather than the exact activity serving as the distraction.  To speculate, if you are driving with your eyes and attention on the road, following all the signs, and responding appropriately to other vehicles, then the coffee by your side probably isn’t a big deal.  If you just rear-ended someone due to spilling hot coffee in your lap while trying to put sugar in it, then you might be in a different situation (and might want to contact an attorney).

It’s easy to get confused by the evolving state of Minnesota DWI case law.  For the last three years, it has been something of a moving target for judges and lawyers. The most recent decision, last week’s State v. Trahan, adds yet more wrinkles to the wash.  Briefly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held warrantless blood tests to be unconstitutional, as are criminal charges based on one’s refusal of said blood test.  Trahan is best analyzed in perspective of other groundbreaking DWI case law of recent years:

Missouri v. McNeely (2013). The U.S. Supreme Court held a warrant is needed before drawing blood from DWI suspects except in certain emergencies. This decision trumped the prior Minnesota standard established in the case of State v. Shriner, which held that dissipation of blood alcohol creates the exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless blood draw (provided that officers have probable cause to believe that the defendant committed criminal vehicular homicide or operation.) A groundbreaking case, but the analysis was only beginning for Minnesota.

State v. Brooks (2013). Following on the heels of McNeely, the  Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that blood and urine samples taken from the defendant without a warrant were constitutional, because he “consented” to the tests at issue (despite being told that refusal was a criminal offense.) The Court concluded that in light of Brook’s actions (and that his lawyer was advising him from the passenger seat), plus Minnesota’s implied consent law (anyone who drives a motor vehicle “consents” to a chemical test when certain conditions are met), Brooks had “consented” to the searches at issue.

State v. Bernard (2015). The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld warrantless breath tests as permissible as a search incident to a valid arrest. It also upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota’s implied consent statute as applied to breath tests, in cases where the officer requesting the test would have had grounds to obtain a valid search warrant requiring the driver to submit to testing. The Court did not analyze the constitutionality of warrantless blood tests, however, basically setting the stage for Trahan.

State v. Trahan (2015). The Minnesota Court of Appeals then held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception did not justify a warrantless blood test, as a dissipating blood alcohol level was not an exigent circumstance.  Thus, a warrantless blood test would constitute an unreasonable search. The Court also held that the implied consent statute criminalizing test refusal was not narrowly tailored and thus violated defendant’s right to due process. The invasive nature of testing blood rather than breath was a distinction from Bernard.

This represents some quickly-changing case law for legal professionals to stay on top of (not to mention for non-professionals who might find themselves pulled over).  Use the links provided to brush up on the analyses of these cases.  Then stay tuned, as the Minnesota Supreme Court is likely to weigh in on the issues before long.