Ramsey County Law Library Blog

For one unlucky Michigan man, what happened in St. Paul didn’t necessarily stay in St. Paul.  This week the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a Ramsey County District Court judge erred in planning to dismiss the case involving a Michigan man who pleaded guilty to misdemeanor prostitution.  Last year in St. Paul, the man had responded to an online ad and offered an undercover officer money to have sex with him.  The judge sentenced him to a day in jail, a year of probation, and ordered him to complete the Breaking Free educational program and pay $1,081 in fees and fines.  Over the prosecutor’s objections, the judge ruled that the guilty plea would be vacated and the misdemeanor charge dismissed if the defendant completed probation and remained law-abiding for two years.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the sentencing arrangement ordered by the District Court was similar to a “stay of adjudication,” which can’t be ordered by a judge over the objection of the prosecutor unless “there is a clear abuse of prosecutorial discretion in charging.”  A St. Paul City Attorney told the press that “vacate-and-dismiss” sentences have been routinely sought in prostitution cases, stating that the effect of such dismissals diminishes accountability among defendants and make it seem like a crime didn’t happen.   Yet the judge in this case stated that such “vacate-and-dismiss” resolutions are common agreements in Ramsey County suburban municipal courts, and it would be unfair to hold those who commit the same offense in St. Paul to a different outcome.

This decision sparks questions about possible uneven enforcement of prostitution laws across Ramsey County, and further beyond.  One can appreciate the logic of the judge in seeking to apply the statute evenly across municipalities of the District, rather than encourage an “urban versus suburban” model of enforcement.  One can also appreciate the City Attorney’s argument that the statute has to be applied as it as written, with accountability of the defendant considered.  This is noteworthy considering this old case from the Minnesota Supreme Court which reflects a time when law enforcement typically went after “johns” and not prostitutes.   For more about the history of prostitution in St. Paul, consider reading Controlling Vice: Regulating Brothel Prostitution in St. Paul, 1865-1883 (Ohio State University Press 1998), which is available at the State Law Library.

Last week the Minnesota Supreme Court handed down a long-awaited ruling in the matter of a woman who lost her driver’s license after driving while drunk to flee her abusive husband.  Jennifer Axelberg had a BAL of 0.16 percent when she drove less than a mile from her drunk and abusive husband. He had her cellphone, and she didn’t think she could outrun him on foot. She drove off only after he smashed the car’s windshield and climbed onto the vehicle.  In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Lorie Gildea, the Court weighed the public safety risk posed by a drunken driver against the danger faced by a domestic violence victim, and concluded that Minnesota’s implied-consent statute §169A.53 contains no so-called necessity defense.  Check the Supreme Court Opinion page to read this opinion (A12-1341).

In his dissent, Justice Page wrote that the Court’s decision implied “that the necessity defense is unavailable not only in cases of domestic abuse, but also in cases in which a victim’s seeking refuge from a violent physical or sexual assault or kidnapping, and the court’s decision thus discourages those individuals from seeking shelter in a motor vehicle as well.”  Recognizing the quandary that the Statute and the Court’s decision may put victims of domestic abuse in, Justice Lillehaug wrote in his dissent that “the Legislature may wish to consider further measures to protect the next Jennifer Axelberg.”  Indeed, both Axelberg’s attorney and the executive director of the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women see hope in this decision that the Legislature will recognize the need to adapt the implied consent statute to allow for exceptions like fleeing danger in the not-so-distant future