Ramsey County Law Library Blog

 This week the Minnesota Supreme Court limited law enforcement’s ability to search and seize personal possessions.  The opinion in Garcia-Mendoza vs 2003 Chevy Tahoe held that constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure also applied to Minnesota civil matters, and not just criminal ones.  Similarly, the ruling in State v. Rohde determined that police had illegally impounded and searched a properly parked vehicle.

Both cases involved drugs found while searching vehicles whose impoundments were later found to be illegal. The exclusionary rule under U.S. Supreme Court rulings has long held that illegally-obtained evidence obtained cannot be used criminal proceedings (see Mapp vs. Ohio(1961)).  The Minnesota Supreme Court had not previously extended the exclusionary rule principle to Minnesota civil matters such as vehicle forfeiture.  (Civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to take property allegedly connected to a crime. See Minnesota Statutes §§609.531-5319.)  Until recently in Minnesota, authorities could use civil forfeiture even if a person was not convicted.

The Court particularly pointed to the Minnesota Constitution in its Garcia-Mendoza decision, which states that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Former Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura
(Minnesota Historical Society)

Former Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura has had his day in court, which culminated yesterday in a judgment and large award in his favor.  In an 8-2 verdict Tuesday in U.S. District Court, the jury found Ventura had been defamed by late Navy SEAL-turned-author Chris Kyle in the 2012 bestseller “American Sniper,” and awarded him more than $1.8 million for his reputation and for “unjust enrichment.  The money apparently wasn’t the big win of the day for Jesse, who expressed relief that his “reputation is restored now.”

Defamation is a tough tort to tackle. The classic requirements of proving a defamation case are spelled out in the case of New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  A plaintiff must show: 1. The statement or communication was defamatory; 2. That the statement or communication was false; 3. That the statement or communication referred to the plaintiff; and 4. That the statement or communication was published.  Public figures must also prove that the defendant acted with “actual malice.” For Ventura, this primarily meant proving three things: That Kyle’s story was defamatory, that it was false and that Kyle knew it was false or published it with serious doubts about its veracity.  For more information on defamation, here is a helpful page from the Nolo website that sums up the tort in simple terms.   Here are also some of the most timeless Jesse quotes in case you find those more interesting than his lawsuit.

For one unlucky Michigan man, what happened in St. Paul didn’t necessarily stay in St. Paul.  This week the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a Ramsey County District Court judge erred in planning to dismiss the case involving a Michigan man who pleaded guilty to misdemeanor prostitution.  Last year in St. Paul, the man had responded to an online ad and offered an undercover officer money to have sex with him.  The judge sentenced him to a day in jail, a year of probation, and ordered him to complete the Breaking Free educational program and pay $1,081 in fees and fines.  Over the prosecutor’s objections, the judge ruled that the guilty plea would be vacated and the misdemeanor charge dismissed if the defendant completed probation and remained law-abiding for two years.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the sentencing arrangement ordered by the District Court was similar to a “stay of adjudication,” which can’t be ordered by a judge over the objection of the prosecutor unless “there is a clear abuse of prosecutorial discretion in charging.”  A St. Paul City Attorney told the press that “vacate-and-dismiss” sentences have been routinely sought in prostitution cases, stating that the effect of such dismissals diminishes accountability among defendants and make it seem like a crime didn’t happen.   Yet the judge in this case stated that such “vacate-and-dismiss” resolutions are common agreements in Ramsey County suburban municipal courts, and it would be unfair to hold those who commit the same offense in St. Paul to a different outcome.

This decision sparks questions about possible uneven enforcement of prostitution laws across Ramsey County, and further beyond.  One can appreciate the logic of the judge in seeking to apply the statute evenly across municipalities of the District, rather than encourage an “urban versus suburban” model of enforcement.  One can also appreciate the City Attorney’s argument that the statute has to be applied as it as written, with accountability of the defendant considered.  This is noteworthy considering this old case from the Minnesota Supreme Court which reflects a time when law enforcement typically went after “johns” and not prostitutes.   For more about the history of prostitution in St. Paul, consider reading Controlling Vice: Regulating Brothel Prostitution in St. Paul, 1865-1883 (Ohio State University Press 1998), which is available at the State Law Library.

Last week the Minnesota Supreme Court handed down a long-awaited ruling in the matter of a woman who lost her driver’s license after driving while drunk to flee her abusive husband.  Jennifer Axelberg had a BAL of 0.16 percent when she drove less than a mile from her drunk and abusive husband. He had her cellphone, and she didn’t think she could outrun him on foot. She drove off only after he smashed the car’s windshield and climbed onto the vehicle.  In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Lorie Gildea, the Court weighed the public safety risk posed by a drunken driver against the danger faced by a domestic violence victim, and concluded that Minnesota’s implied-consent statute §169A.53 contains no so-called necessity defense.  Check the Supreme Court Opinion page to read this opinion (A12-1341).

In his dissent, Justice Page wrote that the Court’s decision implied “that the necessity defense is unavailable not only in cases of domestic abuse, but also in cases in which a victim’s seeking refuge from a violent physical or sexual assault or kidnapping, and the court’s decision thus discourages those individuals from seeking shelter in a motor vehicle as well.”  Recognizing the quandary that the Statute and the Court’s decision may put victims of domestic abuse in, Justice Lillehaug wrote in his dissent that “the Legislature may wish to consider further measures to protect the next Jennifer Axelberg.”  Indeed, both Axelberg’s attorney and the executive director of the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women see hope in this decision that the Legislature will recognize the need to adapt the implied consent statute to allow for exceptions like fleeing danger in the not-so-distant future

The Law Librarian originally had other blogging plans for this week when the Supreme Court’s ruling on affirmative action in the case of Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action hit the news.  In a 6-2 ruling (with 5 separate opinions), the Court upheld a Michigan constitutional amendment that bans affirmative action in admissions to the state’s public universities.  In the main opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote there was no reason for judicial intervention in state decisions that do not target minority groups.  This decision basically gives the green light to other states seeking to enact measures banning the use of race in admissions or to consider race-neutral alternatives to ensure diversity.  Justice Sotomayor wrote a 58-page dissenting opinion, accusing her colleagues of attempting to “wish away” evidence of the nation’s racial inequality.  Indeed, states that forbid affirmative action in higher education have seen significant drops in the enrollment of black and Hispanic students in their most selective schools.

Affirmative action has been a subject of vigorous debate for decades and will likely continue to be, especially given the fractured nature of this Court decision.  Questions for discourse remain, of course.  For instance, is race-based affirmative action the best policy to broaden access to education, or should it be based on something more race-neutral (like economic means)?  Is race-based affirmative action in education only to benefit the minority students so admitted, or is it also needed for the educational experience of the (typically white) student body majority?  Moreover, how can we expect a decision like this to ultimately play out in Minnesota?